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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooooo
MICHAEL POULSEN
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT
CASE NO. 920701-CA
vs.
LYNN POULSEN
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT,

PRIORITY 15

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
Department of Human Services,
Intervenor, Appellee,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
RESPONSE TO STATE'S STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The Appellant Appeals a Rule 60(b) Motion requesting Relief
from the Final Judgment of Honorable David S. Young on 21 October
1992. The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over final
orders of other agencies as well as the Third District Court
pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(a).
The trial Court clearly abused it's discretion by not having
any substantial evidence before it to allow ORS to Intervene and
set Aside Appellant's Withhold and Deliver Order. There was no
Notice sent to Appellant and no arguments allowed before the Court
and therefore denied Appellant due process and violated Article 1
1

sec. 7 of the Utah State Constitution.
The Court did not act correctly in allowing the ORS to
Intervene. Intervention has conditions and certain rules and
regulations and standards that were not present. The ORS also was
acting in violation of it's own Rules and Regulations for case
closures, see CFR 303.11(a)(9) & Human Services, Recovery Services,
R527-273-1 B.1.3.
The Court should not have allowed the Setting Aside of the
Appellant's Withhold and Deliver as a matter of res judicata. The
Appellant already had adjudicated the collection of her support
monies and was receiving her support monies.
The Utah Statute 62A-11-404 (1989 & Supp. 1992) & 62A-11-414
is facially unconstitutional and vague as to terms and conditions
and has been used arbitrarily

and capriciously, without any

standard for reasonableness being applied in this case.
All matters presently before this Court are proper before this
Court, timely, and have been raised in the lower Court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The Appellant responds and hereby objects to the State's
Statement of the Facts.
1.

The Plaintiff and the Appellant separated on 14 November 1990.
2

The Plaintiff then filed for Divorce on 26 March 1991. For eighteen
months previous to the State's intervention, both agreed to allow
Plaintiff to pay his Child Support and Alimony voluntarily without interference by the State.
2.

On 27 March 1992, the Plaintiff was granted a Default Divorce

Decree which the Appellant appealed to this Court from said Decree,
and this Court summarily reversed on 3 March 1993 for fraud and
duress (Case No. 92-0523CA). The District Court granted Appellant
a Extra Ordinary Writ of Relief and there is only in place a
temporary support order at this time (Case No. 910491255).
3.

The Plaintiff had become behind in his support monies $776.00

within less than 3 months after the Decree was granted and stopped
sending any support monies to Appellant completely by June of 1992.
4.

Sometime during June of 1992, the Plaintiff's fifteen year old

daughter contacted the Plaintiff whom she had not seen for over
eighteen months to inquire why he was making things so difficult.
The Plaintiff told his daughter that he "had a new life and that
the family would just have to cjo on Welfare".
5.

On 30 June 1992, the Appellant sought the help of the District

Court to collect her support monies from Plaintiff. The Honorable
David S. Young granted the Appellant her Withhold and Deliver on 30
June 1992, as the Appellant had already brought an Order to Show
Cause Hearing on her own and reduced the arrearages to judgment.
3
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The day that Appellant received

her remedy

through the

District Court, 30 June 1992, Commissioner Michael Evans told the
Plaintiff that the voluntary choice to send support monies was now
"out of his hands" and in the Courts.
7.

The

next

day,

1 July

1992, the Plaintiff

applied

for

assistance to collect the Appellant's support obligations, which he
had refused to send voluntarily.
8.

The Appellant was told by one of the Clerks at Third District

Court on 16 July 1992, that ORS had filed a Ex-parte Motion to
Intervene.
9.

The Appellant went to ORS and talked with Shanna Hair and

Renee Jimenez and told them both that Plaintiff had just applied to
delay and defraud the Appellant of her support monies.
10.

The Appellant gave ORS a letter in writing that she did not

want her child support collected through the State as she feared
she would not receive the full amount.
11.

Since the Intervention of the ORS, the Plaintiff is $4,197.00

in arrears to the Appellant and her children's detriment as
Appellant is not receiving any form of assistance from the State,
nor is she employed.
12.

The Appellant received by mail a copy of an Ex-parte Motion to

Intervene, but no Notice of Hearing

as now appears

in the

Appellee's Brief. Furthermore, Commissioner Thomas Arnett stated on
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19 August 1992, that "there was no Notice in the Courts file"
(Appellant's Exhibit J ) .
13.

The Commissioner was in full agreement with the Appellant that

the State had no right to Intervene when Appellant and her five
minor children neither receive, nor want State Welfare.
14.

The Appellant had argued the State's right to Intervene, and

also at that time stated that she had not received Notice of what
the hearing was for, nor had she received the State's Motion to Set
Aside Defendant's Withhold and Deliver.
15.

The Appellant brought forward the issues of privacy, previous

conduct of parties and intent of Plaintiff to evade his support
obligations. Issues of right to contract, standing of the State's
right to Intervene and due process violation, as well as the Open
Court's Clause.
16.

Commissioner Arnett then stated that the State had already

been granted the right to Intervene and only the Setting Aside was
at issue for this Hearing. This Motion for Setting Aside Withhold
and Deliver was never received by the Appellant.
17.

The Appellant then filed a Motion for Relief Rule 60(b) from

State's Intervention, and Judge Young denied the Appellant her
request for a Hearing on this Motion 22 September 1992.
18.

The Plaintiff is now $4,197.00 in arrears and the Appellant

and her children have been irreparably injured as a result of the
5

collusion of the State and Plaintiff, and has never received the
Court ordered amount of $900.00 per month since the Intervention.
Barlow v. Collins. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).

RESPONSE TO SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Appellant is appealing from a Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief
which is timely and proper before this Court.
A Rule 60(b) can be made up to three months after a final
order. The Appellant filed timely in the lower Court.
A Rule 60(b)(3) states that "relief may be obtained if the
judgment was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party".
Rule 60(b)(6) "if it is no longer equitable that judgment
should have application".
Rule

60(b)(7)

"any other

reason

justifying

relief

from

operation of judgement".
The trial Court abused it's discretion by not allowing the
Appellant to have her side heard. To explain the previous conduct
of

the

parties

and

the

fraudulent

reasons

for

Plaintiff's

application to the State.
The Court abused it's discretion by acting arbitrarily and
capriciously with no substantial evidence ever submitted to the

6

Court to allow the State Standing or to determine an "injury in
fact" and "zone of interests" of the State.
The

only

ones

who

have

suffered

as

a

result

of

the

Intervention are the persons whose interests the State contends to
be protecting, but the fact remains that the Plaintiff has been
allowed to advance $4,197.00 in arrearages, with the State's
assistance.
The Court asked for no proffers of proof and no testimony was
given in support of State's Intervention and the Appellant moves
this Court to reverse the lower Courts decision and grant a
reversal on Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion and Order the State to
pay the $4,197.00 in arrearages that Appellant and her children
have suffered.

ARGUMENT
RESPONSE TO POINT I OF APPELLEE

The Court has jurisdiction to hear cases from a final
appealable Order. A rule 60(b), of which the lower Court denied to
Appellant, is a final appealable Order from which an appeal may be
taken. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). The Appellant filed her appeal timely and has shown an
obvious abuse of discretion by the lower Court in which the
7

Appellant has proven that if all evidence would have been heard
before the lower Court at a Hearing or trial, would have resulted
in a different judgment than the one that was entered. State ex rel
Utah State Dept. of Social Services v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053
(Utah 1983). The trial Court made an erroneous assumption on
absolutely no substantial evidence before it that the State could
Intervene and Set Aside an Order.
Furthermore, the judgment by the trial Court was clearly an
abuse of discretion as the State should have been estopped when a
substantial injustice would result from the State's involvement
under these unusual circumstances and there would be no adverse
effect on public welfare. Utah State University v. Sutro & Co., 646
P.2d 715 (Utah 1982).

RESPONSE TO POINT II
The Court clearly abused it's discretion by not granting
Appellant's Rule 60(b) Motion. The results have been unjust and
abusive to the very persons the Legislature and the Courts are
supposed to protect. The State cannot deny that there was no need
to Set Aside Appellant's Withhold and Deliver, if it's interest is
to lessen cost to public welfare and dependency, and ensure that
child support be enforced.
The State has only allowed Mr. Poulsen, who neither contacts
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nor cares for his children, to achieve arrearages to the children's
detriment. Mr. Poulsen also has a working spouse and two other
people in the home currently employed and has been able to take
trips this summer to Hawaii and Disneyland, all while the State
supports the robbing of Appellant's child support monies.
The State has denied the Appellant the right to a remedy
through the Court's as Constitutionally guaranteed to her and yet
has shown no standing or "injury in fact".
The Court should reverse the lower Court's decision and allow
the Appellant to collect her child support and alimony monies,
according to her Court Order, totaling $900.00 per month.
The Court acted improperly in denying the Rule 60(b) Motion
for Relief. The results have been unjust and abusive to the very
persons the Legislature and the Courts are Aside supposed to
protect. The State cannot deny that there was no to Set Aside
Appellant's Withhold and Deliver, if it's interest to lessen cost
to public welfare and dependency and ensure child support be
enforced.
Setting Aside the Appellant's Withhold and Deliver Order has
irreparably injured the Appellant to collect her child support
monies according to common-law rights and remedies, one of those
being a restoration the Judicial Order that would allow the
Appellant to have support monies of $900.00 per month sent directly
9

to her and children.

RESPONSE TO POINT III A, B, & C and IV

The Court did not inquire as to the proper notice requirements
that govern all agency adjudicative actions, and to determine if
proper notice was given and also establish necessary standing in
the Court.
The Court should have allowed evidence and argument, neither
of which the State shows any proffers of, only a statute that is
quoted in part.
Title IV-D 651 et seq. section 666(a)(8) states that "when
there is an availability of other remedies and other relevant
considerations

and that application would

not carry

out the

purposes of either the Congress or the State Legislature that
654(6) would be inappropriate".
The facts supporting this very clause are:
(A)

That the Appellant had a very viable and workable Withhold and

Deliver in place and was receiving her child support.
(B)

That the previous conduct of the parties had been one of not

going to the State for any kind of assistance.
(C)

That

Mr.

Intervention

Poulsen
and

has

only

sought

successfully
10

refuge

in

achieved

the
an

State's
arrearage

accumulation, in an amount in excess of $4,197.00.
(D)

It was neither the intent of the Congress nor of the

Legislature to hinder and impede independence and self reliance of
the Appellant in her efforts to actively pursue collection of her
child support through her own honest efforts.
(E) The Military does not send it's child support monies through
the State but instead the Department of Treasury sends payments
directly to the Obligee.
(F) The Appellant simply achieved the same results through a
Judicial Order, signed by Judge Young, to have Mr. Poulsen's
support obligations sent directly to the Appellant, as there was no
debt of public assistance owed by neither the Appellant, her
children, nor Mr. Poulsen.
The Social Security Title IV-D program was not enacted to
abuse women and children and protect dead-beat Dads and yet that is
the very result of the State's Intervention and Setting Aside of
Appellant's withhold and Deliver. The State can marshall no
evidence before this Court that their "assistance" they have
benefitted anyone but Mr. Poulsen, as he has been "relieved" of
$4,197.00 with that amount accruing to the detriment and not
benefit of the five Poulsen children.
To state that anyone for any reason, even with the intent to
evade and defraud the very persons the State claims to protect, has
11

a right to cause such injustice, shows the State acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in this case Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Comm'n..
766 P.2d 1089, 1091 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Mr. Poulsen did not apply to the State to enforce his child
support. It was already being collected, but to hinder and defraud
the Appellant and her children. Mr. Poulsen's 15 year old daughter
contacted her father, for the first time in over a year and a half,
to inquire why he was refusing to pay child support. Mr. Poulsen
told his daughter that it was time to go on to welfare as he had a
new life now.
The procedural safe guards throughout the ORS have been
invoked by the Appellant. The Appellant's not only objected to the
State's interference in writing, but also in person (R527-273-1
B.l). There was a written judicial order in place and the State
intervened in bad faith as the Appellant had shown that the State's
intervention was not needed (R527-300-l(2)(b)(iii). The Appellant
placed in writing that she wanted NO interference from ORS and to
terminate any further proceedings (R527-300-8(1).b). The Obligor
does not owe the State as the Appellant has received no assistance.
The State further does not comply with the CFR 303.11(9) as
Appellant notified ORS in writing and also filed a Notice of a
claim against them for interfering with the Appellant's child
support collection.
12

The State claims that they must provide this "service" to the
Plaintiff but discriminates against the custodial parent, the
Appellant and her children ad refuse to close this case as pursuant
to Congressional Federal Regulations.
The State has not marshalled forth any evidence as real party
in interest or right to join.
The State neither had to establish, modify or enforce a Court
Order pursuant to 62-A-ll-106(1). The State furthermore entered
into a matter of which there is no evidence that the ORS had a
right to recover anything from the judgement Order. Therefore, it
was erroneous for the lower Court to have allowed the State to
Intervene and not require evidence as condition of Intervention as
in required in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 17 and 19 to be
strictly followed. The State provided no evidence that by not
joining it would impair or impede it's ability to protect any
interest, as the State can show none.
The State did not have to help Mr. Poulsen enforce the child
support. The Appellant effectively and adequately was enforcing
collection of her support obligations.
The State failed to follow proper procedural requirements.
The Appellant would like Court to take Judicial Notice that the
State's Ex-parte Motion to Intervene was not filed with the trial
Court on 23 July 1992 as stated in Appellee's brief (Page 7). The
13

Appellant was not sent by U.S. mail a Notice of State's Motion to
Set Aside Withhold and Deliver as evidenced by the Notice of
Objections to State's Ex-parte Motion to Intervene filed 31 July
1992. The Appellant never received any Notice of Hearings as stated
by Commissioner Arnett and as evidenced by exhibit in Appellant's
brief transcript

of proceedings and therefore did not have an

opportunity to be heard on the issue of the Setting Aside of
Appellant's Withhold and Deliver.

RESPONSE TO POINT V

The Appellee continuously has evaded the issues of right to
contract.
The Appellant's Divorce Decree specifically stated that both
the child support of $700.00 and the alimony of $200.00 were to be
paid by wage assignment. A wage assignment is contractual in
nature. Western v. Hodgson C.A.W., (VA 1974) 494 F.2d 379.
The

State

helped

support

Mr.

Poulsen

in

completing

a

fraudulent transfer, of which all essential elements of fraud
exist:
1.

The parties entered into an agreement to voluntarily comply.

2.

When Mr. Poulsen realized that he could run to the State to

fraudulently transfer any right to Appellant's child support to be
14

paid by Wage Assignment.
3.

The risk to the Obligor has harmed the Appellant and her five

minor children and has saved Mr. Poulsen $4,197.00. The State does
not help to collect these arrearages, only allows them to accrue therefore the transfer was made with the intent to hinder and
delay. This was addressed in Appellant's Motion as well as oral
argument, on 19 August 1992 before Commissioner Thomas Arnett.
The Appellant further claims a right to petition the Court's
for an injury done to her person and for relief from a debtor.

CONCLUSION

The State's intervention and Setting Aside of Appellant's
Withhold and Deliver and because of the State's policy of 50%
Garnishment, has not helped the very persons, the children they
have purported to be helping.
The Plaintiff is now over $4,197.00 in arrearages to the
advantage of the Plaintiff and not the children. The Court should
look to the intent of the Legislature and determine if the State
has helped, or hindered, the rightful collection of the Appellant's
Support monies.
When any statute's rigid application defeats the higher
purpose that of doing justice, then the "unusual circumstances" of

15

the case must be applied. There is no substantial adverse effect on
public

policy

and

the

only

one's

injured

by

the

State's

intervention have been the children, who have already suffered
great emotional and physical abuse by the Plaintiff.
The Appellee raises the argument that the Appellant has not
shown an abuse of the trial Courts discretion Katz v. Piece, 732
P.2d 92,93 (Utah 1984); Baker v. Western Sur. Co, 757 P.2d 878, 881
(Ut. Ct. App 1988). However, when a Motion for Relief from a Order
or Judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the
District Court has no discretion; if jurisdiction is lacking, the
Order cannot stand without denying due process to the one against
whom it runs. See In Re Marriage of Stroud, 631 P.2d 168, 170 n.5
(colo. 1981); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure

2862

(1973).

Therefore,

the

propriety

of

the

jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision to grant
relief, becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to
District Court. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Blgmguist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989) Madsen v. Borthick, 769
P.2d 245, 247 (Ut. 1988).
The Appellant nowhere cites as her authority for her Withhold
and Deliver as the Statute cited by Appellee, but instead chose to
exercise her common-law right to obtain her support monies (see
Withhold and Deliver dated 30 June 1992 in Appellant's Brief,
16

signed by Judge Young), the Statute being cited as the authority
for the intervention and subsequent Setting Aside by ORS was not
even invoked by the Appellant, but her Common-law right and
constitutional right to the Court, the matter was adjudicated and
Ordered by Judge Young and the ORS should be estopped because of
res judicata.
The Trial Court had made a Order to grant Appellant's Withhold
and Deliver and therefore the Court lacked in rem jurisdiction to
allow the Intervention of ORS, who entered Ex-parte under a Statute
that did not apply in this matter. Furthermore, the Court lacked in
personam jurisdiction, as the ORS entered without Notice to the
Appellant.
This appeal stems from a fraudulently obtained Divorce Decree
by

Plaintiff.

To

further

add

insult

to

injury,

Plaintiff

perpetuated another fraud action by applying for ORS' help in
getting out of his obligation with the intervention of ORS and
their subsequent setting aside of the Appellant's withhold and
deliver. Trial court abused its discretion by denying 60(b) motion
without giving Appellant due process.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Based upon the following facts and evidence before the
17

Appellant Court, the Appellant prays this court for a reversal of
the lower Courts order. Grant the Appellant the right to collect
her support monies through her own efforts or remand this for trial
of a declaratory judgment*
Award

the

Appellant

the

$4,197.00

that

the

States'

Intervention has allowed the Plaintiff to obtain to be paid to her
and collected, by the ORS from the Plaintiff

and award the

Appellant the costs of this Appeal and any other relief this Court
deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted this day July 20, 1993.

POULSEN, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that (2Q

July 1993, I mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant was served upon the
opposing counsel via U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid and
addressed to:
RENEE M. JIMENEZ
Attorney for Appellee
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
P.O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980
Michael Poulsen, Plaintiff
5235 South Glendon Street W-l
Murray, Utah 84123

POULSEN, DEFENDANT/APPELLANT
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ADDENDUM
Social Security Act, 42 USCS sec. 666(a)(8):
Procedures under which all child support orders which are issued or
modified in the State will include provision for withholding from
wages, in order to assure that withholding as a means of collecting
child support is available if arrearages occur without the
necessity of filing application for services under this part [42
USCS, sec. 651 et seq.].
Notwithstanding section 454(20)(B) [42 USCS sec. 654(20)(B)], the
procedures which are required under paragraphs (3), (4), (6), and
(7) need not be used or applied in cases where the State determines
(using guidelines which are generally available within the State
and which take into account the payment record of the absent
parent, the availability of other remedies, and other relevant
considerations) that such use or application would not carry out
the purposes of this part [42 USCS sec. 651 et seq.] or would be
otherwise inappropriate in the circumstances.
Human Services, Recovery Services, R527-273-l(B) Administrative
Process, Non-AFDC Services.
The bureau may limit future Non-AFDC services to enforcement
of current support only or terminate the contract when the obligee:
1.
Objects to the results of the assessment; or
2.
Negotiates a payment schedule with the obligor without the
knowledge or involvement of the team; or
3.
Does not comply with other terms of the Non-AFDC contract.
Human Services, Recovery Services, R527-300-1-3 Income Withholding.
1. .Income withholding is defined as withholding child support
from an obligor's income. The payor of income forwards the amount
withheld to the Office of Recovery Services (ORS).
2.
Income withholding is divided into two categories:
a.
Immediate income withholding applies to all orders issued or
modified after October 13, 1990, which do not provide that
immediate withholding will not occur.
b.
Initiated income withholding applies to:
i.
orders issued prior to October 13, 1990, which have not been
modified since October 13, 1990, and
ii. to those orders issued after October 1990, which had a finding
20

of good cause not to require immediate withholding, or
iii. to orders issued after October 13, 1990, which had a finding
that a written agreement between the Non-AFDC parties was
sufficient and immediate withholding was not needed,
3.
In addition, income withholding may be initiated by service of
an advance notice in a case which has an order issued prior to
October 13, 1990, which has not been modified since October 13,
1990, even though the obligor is not delinquent as defined in R527300-2, if:
a.
the obligor and the obligee have signed a subsequent agreement
which the obligor has failed to meet (for example, while the order
does not require payment by a specific date, there is a written
agreement that payment will be made on the first day of each
month), and
b.
the obligee request that income withholding be initiated.
Human Services, Recovery Services, R527-300-8-1(b) Income
Withholding Suspension and Termination.
1*
Income withholding should be terminated if:
b.
the Non-AFDC obligee terminates in writing authorization for
ORS to collect support on her behalf, income withholding was
administratively implemented and the obligor no longer owes child
support to Utah or other state on whose behalf Utah is acting, and
the obligee does not want withholding to continue.
45 CFR Ch. Ill (10-1-92 Ed.) sec. 303.11(b)(9)&(12) Case closure
criteria.
(9) The non-AFDC custodial parent requests closure of a case and
there is no assignment to the State of medical support under 42 CFR
433.146 or of arrearages which accrued under a support order;
(12) In a non-AFDC case receiving
services
under Sec.
302.33(a)(1)(i) or
(iii), the IV-D agency document the
circumstances of the custodial parent's noncooperation and an
action by the custodial parent is essential for the next step in
providing IV-D services.
(c) In cases meeting the criteria in paragraphs (b)(1) through (7)
and (11) and (12) of this section, the State must notify the
custodial parent in writing 60 calendar days prior to closure of
the case of the State's intent to close the case.
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